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Snce the begnnng of agrcultural reform n the late 1970s and early 1980s, grain output in China has increased significantly. The long-standing problem of grain supply shortages has basically been solved. However, grain production and pricing are still not fully liberalised and large fluctuations in grain prices, together with short-term shortages and surpluses of grain, have occurred several tmes. These events have serously affected farmers' incomes. Partly as a result, rural-urban income disparities have grown, partcularly n the 1990s.
In 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO). Because of the commtment made to open the domestc market for agrcultural products, grain imports are increasing rapidly. Domestic grain production and farmers' ncomes are facng new challenges. Ths chapter examnes recent developments in rural-urban income differentials, especially in light of WTO commitments, the appropriateness of related domestic policies such as grain pricing and urbanisation policies, and the effects of adjustments of these polces n response to the new challenges.
Agriculture and rural-urban income disparity in China
After half a century of rapid industrialisation, the dominant role of China's agricultural sector (including farming, forestry, animal husbandry and 04 fisheries) in the economy has been replaced by the industry and service sectors. In spite of significant growth in agricultural production, the share of the agrcultural sector n GDP declned from 51 per cent to only 15 per cent from 1952 to 2001. However, because of the large size and continued growth of the rural population, the employment structure of the agricultural and non-agrcultural sectors changed far more slowly than the change n the output structure. Agricultural employment accounted for 84 per cent of total employment in 1952, and declined to 50 per cent in 2001. At the same time, agricultural employment increased from 173 million to 365 million.
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The share of the rural populaton changed even more slowly. The rural population still accounts for 62 per cent of China's total population, as compared to 85 per cent in 1953 (Table 4 .1).
Farming remains the most important component of Chinese agriculture; although reduced, it still accounted for 55 per cent of the gross value of agricultural output in year 2001. Surveys show that, in year 2000, 51 per cent of rural household ncome came from the agrcultural sector as a whole and 39 per cent from farming (Figure 4 .1). Grain production has been the major farming activity, especially in less developed regions.
Movement of the agricultural population to non-agricultural sectors was hampered by the restrctve central polces durng the pre-reform perod from the 1950s to the late 1970s. Rural ndustralsaton and urbansaton has been speeded up snce the market reforms. Such developments have provded close to 200 mllon addtonal non-agrcultural jobs to farmers n rural and urban areas over the past 24 years. Still, the number of farmers has ncreased and there appears to be more surplus agrcultural labour than ever before. Rural income grew slowly, and differences between rural and urban ncomes became larger. Table 4 .2 shows changes n ncome per capta n rural and urban areas of China and its three major regions from 1980 to 2000. It shows that rural income per capita in rural areas was 47 per cent of urban income in 1980; this ratio had declined to 35 per cent by 2000. Rural-urban income disparity increased in all three regions, but more seriously in the least-developed west region where the rural-urban income ratio fell from 45 to 30 per cent during the same period. In year 2000, the average annual rural income per capita in the west region was 1,713 yuan (or US$207), only half of the average rural ncome n the east regon. There s no mport quota for soybeans. The tarff rate for soybeans is 3 per cent
The average tarff rate for all agrcultural products s to be reduced from 22 to 17.5 per cent.
All export subsdes are to be elmnated.
• Other non-tariff restrictions on imports of agricultural products, such as licensing, are to be eliminated. This includes restrictions on mports of wheat from the northwest areas of North Amerca whch may have TCK disease (a fungal disease).
The mport quota of 22 mllon tonnes s large compared wth the historical level of imports. During the 1990s, the average annual imports of grain were 9.0 million tonnes, and there were net exports of 0.8 million tonnes annually. There was only one year, 1995, when grain imports exceeded 20 million tonnes, and this resulted in a serious surplus of grain on the domestc market. The 2004 mport quota s equal to 5.5 per cent of the total output in year 2000-not a very large proportion-however, the size of the domestic grain market is far smaller than total output, because half of the gran output s consumed by farmers and does not enter the market. Calculations show that the 2004 TRQ accounts for 11.9 per cent of the domestic grain market. It is estimated that full utilisation of the TRQ in the short run, without major structural adjustment, could mean the loss of 9 mllon farmng jobs (Wang 2002) .
Chna does not have a comparatve advantage n the producton of major grains such as wheat, corn and soybeans. A comparison shows that the average prces of these three products n rural markets n the perod between 1995 and 2000 were 7 per cent, 30 per cent and 31 per cent higher than their 2000 c.i.f. prices, respectively. It is not surprising, therefore, that mports of soybeans and soybean ol are ncreasng rapdly. The domestc price of rice is lower than c.i.f. prices, although its average quality is also lower than that of imports. Thus, in the face of increasing imports, domestic production of these grains will decline significantly.
In 2000 and 2001, cereal imports were at moderate levels of 3.15 and 3.44 million tonnes, respectively. Due to surpluses and the low prices of grain in the domestic market, 3 as a result of the over-supply since 1998, it is unlikely that the TRQ will be fully used in the near future. However, the TRQ is preventing domestic grain prices from recovering to their recent levels. Meanwhile, soybean imports rose to the historically high level of 13.9 million tonnes in 2001, nearly as much as the domestic output (National Bureau of Statstcs 2002). Ths has led to a large surplus n the soybean market.
• It is clear that without major adjustments in the production structure, the growing grain imports will significantly affect farmers' incomes and further widen the rural-urban income gap.
However, the WTO accession provides great possibilities for reforming China's agricultural sector, leading to positive long-run effects on farmers' incomes, as it pushes agriculture towards its comparative advantages and higher efficiencies. In 2002, the area sown to grain in China fell by 2 per cent, whereas the total grain output increased by 1 per cent from the previous year. New breeds of soybean with significantly higher quality and higher oil content were introduced to north-east China, the main region of soybean production (China Central Television News 2003) . These are signs indicating that further increases in efficiency in agricultural production are possble n response to the WTO challenge.
However, to increase agricultural efficiency significantly and reduce rural-urban income disparities, not only structural adjustments of agrcultural producton but also broad changes n Chna's domestc gran trade polcy are needed.
The grain pricing system in China and its inconsistencies with WTO accession
The current domestic grain trade policy-which provides grain support prices to farmers and almost monopolises the domestic grain trade system-is not only nconsstent wth the trade lberalsaton but s hardly helpful to farmers.
Agrcultural producton and domestc trade n agrcultural products was partially liberalised in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These reforms changed the long-term stuaton of gran supply shortages nto surpluses. Grain output increased from 283 million tonnes to 407 million tonnes during the 1978-84 period. Grain production was first stimulated by the rise in state purchasing prices, and subsequently fuelled by the abolition of the people's commune system and introduction of the household responsibility system, whch converted the collectve-based producton system nto a prvate system. Grain production was affected by three prices at that time-the state quota price, the above-quota price, and the market price-but none of them were lnked to world market prces.
In nominal terms, quota prices rose slightly in the 1980s at a time of high inflation. From 1985 to 1990, the real price of the major grains (as a weighted average of the prices of rice, wheat and corn) fell by 22 per cent. Market prices played a role at the margin, whereas government prices had a larger mpact on gran producton because the volume of state purchases was so large (Wang 2001) . As the result of low government prices, grain output remaned at the 400 mllon tonnes level n the mddle and late 1980s, while demand for grain increased significantly. The above-quota prces have converged to a level close to market prces snce the early 1990s and fluctuated in line with market prices because of less government nterventon. Ths seems to be the man reason for gran producton reachng 440 mllon tonnes n the early and mddle 1990s.
Stimulated by the improvement in grain supply, the government decided to liberalise the quota control system in 1993. However, most of the stateowned grain dealers have become partially profit-oriented and expected to make profits from holding grain stocks. This resulted in supply shortages and sudden increases in market prices in the short run, which led farmers to hold their products for expected higher prices. Facing sharp increases in market prices and shortages, the government decided to give up the planned reform and, instead, to increase the quota prices substantially in 1994. Quota prices were further increased in 1995-97 to encourage grain production. In 1997, the level of quota prces n real terms (as a weghted average of the prces of rice, wheat and corn) was 51 per cent higher than in 1993 and 20 per cent higher than in 1985 (Ministry of Agriculture, various years). Domestic prices of several grain products significantly exceeded the world market prices. At the same time, the central government introduced a 'provincial governor responsibility system' to insure local self-sufficiency of grain supplies.
Responding to the higher prices, the area sown to grain increased by 4 per cent and gran yeld per hectare ncreased by 10 per cent between 1994 and 1998. Total grain output reached 504 million tonnes in 1996 and 512 million tonnes in 1998. This output far exceeded domestic demand and resulted n decreases n market prces snce 1997.
From 1996 to 2000, market prices of rice, wheat, corn and soybean dropped by 39 per cent, 35 per cent, 44 per cent and 44 per cent, respectvely (authors' calculatons on the basis of data, Information Centre, Ministry of Agriculture). A model simulation shows that the rigid government prcng system has caused serous prce and output nstablty n gran markets (Wang 2001) .
The rgdty of the state-monopolsed gran trade system and mstakes of the grain trading companies added fuel to the flames of supply surpluses. While domestic supply was increasing, there were net imports of 18.67 and 10.25 million tonnes of grain in 1995 and 1996, respectively, which worsened the stuaton of domestc gran surpluses.
Faced with the low market prices, the government announced three policies in 1998: all grain products were to be purchased by the state gran companes at support prces that are hgher than market prces; the state gran companes would have to sell gran at prces not lower than the support prices, so that the state subsidy could be reduced; and bank loans extended to these companes for the purpose of gran purchases were not to be used for other purposes. In addition, in order to make the support prices work, the grain market was monopolised by the state, and private busnesses were prohbted from purchasng gran drectly from farmers.
These polces dd not acheve the goal of protectng farmers' ncomes for several reasons. First, after two decades of market-oriented reform, it was extremely difficult to entirely monopolise grain purchases. Second, the role of policy executers given to the state grain companies conflicted with their role as profit makers. To make profits or to avoid losses, they tended to under-grade the quality of grain they were purchasing from farmers, or make extra deductions for 'wet' and 'impure' grain, so that they could pay no more than market prices. In some cases, they refused to purchase from farmers, only from private dealers, so that under-the-table deals could be made to share the price margin. Third, even if consumer prices could be monopolised at a higher level than would clear the market, the demand for grain was not under state control. As a result, the over-supplied grain could not be sold off and the losses had to be borne by ether the state or farmers. In addition, while farmers benefited little from the support prices, the state had to bear the huge cost of storng a large amount of gran and to nvest n many new storehouses.
Under these pressures, a few changes were made to partially liberalise the grain markets. First, some low quality grains were excluded from the support list in 2001. Second, up to 2002, the local grain market was liberalised in eight east coast provinces that had a grain trade deficit. Third, decision making on support prices was transferred from the central to the provincial governments, resulting in support prices moving closer to market prces.
In spite of these changes, the support price system still conflicted with the market mechanism, and generated more conflict following WTO accession, because t encouraged domestc producton of gran whch dd not have a comparative advantage, and therefore resulted in surpluses and lower market prices. Further liberalisation of the grain market was needed.
Policy considerations in liberalising the grain market
There are several fears about lberalsaton of the gran market.
Without government protection, farmers may be hurt when the market prce of gran s low.
Without the government purchase and supply of grain, food security may not be assured when there are poor harvests or war threats.
Lberalsaton of the gran market and wthdrawal of government subsdes would result n job losses n the state gran trade sector of up to two mllon.
The accumulation of huge financial losses and non-performing loans n the state gran sector has been a hot poltcal potato; once the market is liberalised, the non-performing loans in the state sector would need to be lqudated.
Contrary to these opinions, past experience shows that government intervention has resulted in instability of grain supply, larger price fluctuations, inefficient operations, and huge losses in the state grain trade sector. The earlier the state grain trade sector is reformed, the more quckly the losses can be avoded.
In those provinces in which the grain market has been liberalised, the situation is satisfactory, that is price levels, demand and supply are bascally stable; the formal state gran companes have been ether prvatsed or restructured; and at least some of these busnesses have become profitable.
Liberalisation of the grain market will have at least some benefits. The grain surplus will soon be absorbed, which will help to stabilise market prices. Market prices formed on the basis of demand and supply will give farmers the best avalable nformaton on whch to base ther producton decsons. Other agrcultural products n whch Chna has comparatve advantage, for example, some vegetables, fruits, animal products, and herbal medicines, will replace grains, and this will help to increase farmers' ncomes. The accumulated huge losses and non-performng loans n the state gran sector have become a heavy burden on the economy. Ths burden wll be soon removed after lberalsaton of the gran market.
However, as well as deregulation, the government needs to be proactve n certan areas.
Ant-monopoly regulatons should be enacted and a market supervson system established to reduce the likelihood of monopolistic practices, whether by government or prvate traders.
Due to difficulties in farmers gaining access to market information, the government should accept responsblty for establshng a broad network of nformaton servces to provde farmers wth supply and demand nformaton and forecasts of the domestc and nternatonal food markets.
In some areas, the agricultural technology support and training systems run by government have played an excellent role n helpng farmers to adopt new technology. However, there are still many farmers, particularly in remote areas, who do not enjoy these services. These systems should be expanded. New products, breeds, fertilisers, and other technologes and producton methods should be more wdely and more quckly ntroduced and demonstrated to farmers.
For emergency food supply situations, an effective nation-wide grain reserve system is needed. However, its sole function should be as emergency food supples. Non-government stocks should not be allowed to perform that role. The current gran reserve system s too large and too complicated and inefficient, run as it is by different government agencies at the central, provincial, and municipal levels. Because of the dfferent nterests of the varous agences and the conflicts within and between the agencies, this arrangement can
hardly serve a national goal. Given a shortage of supply, some agencies may support the market using their reserves, while others may buy and hoard grains to make a profit. Therefore, it is necessary to reform the gran reserve system to gve t a sngle objectve and to have it operate under clear guidelines and unified control.
Relationship between rural industrialisation and urbanisation and rural incomes
Gran market deregulaton and structural adjustment n the agrcultural sector are important. However, due to the huge surplus of agricultural labour, these measures will not be sufficient to absorb the shock of agrcultural nternatonalsaton. Polcy adjustments are also needed to accelerate Chna's rural ndustralsaton and urbansaton. During the economic reform period, particularly up to the mid 1990s, rural ndustry developed very quckly and made a major contrbuton to Chna's rapd economc growth (see the World Bank 1996; Ca 2000; . Employment in the Township and Village Enterprise (TVE) sector increased from 28 million to 135 million during the period 1978-96, accounting for more than one-fourth of the total rural labour force. TVEs produce at least one-quarter of the total ndustral output. Development of the TVE sector has also made a great contribution to increases in farmers' ncomes. Nearly one-half of rural household ncome now comes from nonagricultural sources, mainly from the TVE sector. Figure 4. 2 shows that the level of rural income per capita in China's 31 provinces is closely associated wth provncal achevements n rural ndustralsaton.
Rural industries experienced substantial development in the 1980s, partally because the rural reform created a better market envronment whle the urban economy was stll heavly subject to central control. Government policies also had an important influence, encouraging development of TVEs in rural areas and discouraging rural-urban migration.
Development of rural industries slowed in the late 1990s, mainly due to sharper market competition, unfavourable location of the rural enterprises, difficulties in external finance, and lack of infrastructure facilities, technical inputs, and human resources. Meanwhile, urbanisation accelerated. Large numbers of rural labourers migrated to urban areas to find jobs. In year 2001, the urbanisation rate (the ratio of urban to total population) in China reached 38 per cent, whereas it was only 26 per cent in 1990 and 19 per cent in 1980. Improvement in the availability of rural finance will certainly help in the development of rural industries. Nevertheless, the importance of rural ndustralsaton n the economy s lkely to be replaced by urbansaton.
In spite of the acceleration in urban development, the rate of urbanisation in China is still 10-20 percentage points lower than the average of other countres at a smlar ncome level (Wang and Xa 1999) . In particular, medium and large cities are in short supply compared with China's large population. In 2000, there were 121 million people living in the cities of 0.5 million population and above, accounting for only 9.6 per cent of the national population. In the less-developed west region, people lvng n ctes of these szes only account for 5.6 per cent of the regon's populaton. If Chna had a smlar urbansaton rate to the average of other countries at a similar income level, there would be an additional 120-240 mllon people lvng n urban areas. Ths number may also be thought of as the excess supply of people n the rural economy. and rural ncome: provnces havng a hgher urbansaton rate have a hgher rural ncome. Ths relatonshp may mply that urbansaton helps to lberate redundant rural labour from arable land and therefore ncreases agrcultural productvty. Consderng that one-half of the Chnese labour force is still agricultural labour, urbanisation could have a significant impact on agrcultural productvty.
A causality test on the impact of urbanisation and policy considerations
However, this urbanisation effect does not have to be the only explanation for the relationship shown in Figure 4 .3, because both urbanisation and higher rural income can be an outcome of economic growth. In the following, we ntroduce a growth model to test the causalty between urbansaton and regonal economc growth. Ths model has ts orgns n neoclasscal growth models and endogenous growth models (see, for example, where Y it , K it , H it D it and L it are growth rates of GDP, capital stock, human resources (indicated by workers' average year of schooling), cultivated land area and total employment, respectively, of the ith provnce n year t. U it-1 s the urbansaton rate wth a one-year lag (the urbansaton rate used s the rato of urban employment to provncal total employment). DU i(t-1) s the dfference of U i between years t-1 and t-2. ε is the error term. Lagged varables of U and DU are used for the causalty test between urbanisation and economic growth. This specification identifies the effect of urbansaton on growth f U or DU is significant. The reason for including both U and DU n the model s to dstngush the possble growth effect (long-run effect) and level effect (short-run effect) of urbansaton. A significant estimate of U ndcates a contnung effect of urbansaton on growth (meaning urbanisation brings about higher productivity growth), whereas a significant estimate of DU ndcates an mpact from changes n the urbanisation rate on growth, which is a short-run effect. Panel data for 25 provinces and covering the 20 years from 1979 to 1998 have been used. The other sx provnces were excluded due to ncomplete data. Data were provided by Fang Cai and Dewen Wang (2002) and from Natonal Bureau of Statstcs (varous years and 1999b). Captal stock was calculated from the hstorcal data for captal formaton n each provnce.
Both fixed effects and random effects models were estimated. Hausmann's test rejects the hypothess of the approprateness of the random effects model; therefore the results of the fixed effects model are reported in Table 4 .3.
The two versions of the model produce similar results. Most coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. According to version (1'), the elasticities of capital, human resources, employment and land with respect to economic growth are 0.348, 0.431, 0.205 and 0.016, respectively, all in reasonable ranges. The elasticity of land is minor and insignificant, whch s not surprsng because the farmng sector only contrbutes a small proporton to the economy. The estmates of U are significant, which ndcates that every one percentage pont ncrease n the urbansaton rate accelerates provincial economic growth by 0.37 percentage points over the 7-10 per cent high growth rate. DU s omtted from the model due to insignificant coefficient estimates in previous regressions. These results suggest that urbansaton has a long-run mpact on economc growth.
The major dfference n the results of the second verson of the model is the insignificant effect of urbanisation on economic growth in the lessdeveloped west region. The effect is significant in the two other regions. There are two possble reasons for ths result: the effect n the west regon is insignificant because the achievement of urbanisation in the west has been relatively low or, contrary to the other regions, the urban economy in the west provinces has not experienced much restructuring, and is therefore less market-oriented and less efficient.
In general, the results identify a contribution from urbanisation to economc growth va productvty changes. A reasonable explanaton for the hgher productvty growth s mprovement n resource allocaton between the rural and urban sectors. Ths mples that acceleratng urbansaton could be an mportant measure to counteract the short-run sde effects of WTO accession on the agricultural sector, and to reduce the rural-urban ncome gap. Urbansaton n Chna beng behnd other countres s manly a result of the previous central government policies restricting rural-urban migration and growth of large ctes. Some of these restrctons have been removed over the past decade, however, rural-urban migration is still partially restricted by the urban household registration system, job entry barriers, non-access or harder access to health care benefits and schooling, and public security protection, for example, against rural migrants. The low level, or lack, of rural education, job training, and employment information services are also barriers against rural-urban migration. Policy adjustments to remove these restrictions, to improve rural education, and to provide government servces on job tranng and employment nformaton servces are essental for acceleratng urbansaton.
The current urban economy provdes lmted opportunty for rural mgrants because the number and sze of ctes s lmted. Expanson of the urban economy will provide employment opportunities, especially in China's under-developed services sector, which has a significantly higher proporton n the exstng urban economy than n the rural economy. It s the government's responsibility to improve urban planning, urban infrastructure, and publc utltes n order to promote urban development. Wth these changes, many small cities and towns can be expected to become large or medum szed ctes.
Conclusion
The agricultural sector in China is seen as being labour-redundant, largely as the result of polces restrctng the development of urban areas. These polces are also seen as a major reason for Chna's large and growng rural-urban income gap. The situation is worsening after the opening of China's grain market resulting from its WTO accession. In particular, the over-regulated domestic grain market and government pricing conflict with the new situation of openness, since these result in over-supply of grains. It s suggested that the domestc gran market should be lberalsed and the gran prcng system should be deregulated.
For further solutions to the import shock to the agricultural sector as the result of WTO accession, the roles of rural industrialisation and urbanisation are examined. We find that urbanisation has positive effects on rural ncomes and regonal economc growth. Snce the urbansaton rate in China is significantly lower than in other countries at a similar level of GDP per capita, we recommend that urbanisation should be accelerated by deregulating rural-urban migration, promotion of urban infrastructure, improvement in rural education, job training and employment information servces.
Notes
1 Data used n ths paper wthout acknowledgment are from the Natonal Bureau of Statstcs.
2 However, this tariff rate is unlikely to be used in normal cases since the quota is large compared wth the hstorcal record of gran mports. 
